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INTRODUCTION 
Due to the large energy stored in superconducting 
magnets, protection has been part of magnet design since 
a long time, for the LHC magnets since the beginning of 
the 90s. To protect the machine from the energy stored in 
the LHC beams, studies on the beam dumping system 
started during the initial design phase of LHC. To capture 
protons in the tail of the distribution in warm machine 
sections, initially a LEP type collimation system was 
foreseen. Later it was realised that such a system would 
not be adequate and an improved system was developed. 
Work on the beam loss monitor system started after 2000. 
A global and coherent approach to machine protection 
was only started in 2000, including studies of failures and 
consequences. The Beam and Powering Interlock Systems 
were proposed. Other systems for protecting LHC from 
beam-induced damage were introduced. For accelerators 
with higher beam energy such as LHC+, a global 
approach to protection should be taken at an early stage. 
APPROACH TO MACHINE 
PROTECTION 
A general approach to machine protection includes [1]:  
• Establishing a list of failure scenarios that could lead 
to damage and their expected frequency (e.g. power 
converter trips, magnet quenches, …) 
• Quantifying the consequences – what could happen? 
What could be damaged? What is the cost for repair, 
and how long would it take? 
• What can be done to exclude a specific failure? This 
should take priority, if at all possible. As an example, 
for LHC a kicker magnet that deflects the beam by 6 
σ at 7 TeV was proposed to measure the aperture. 
The need for such instrument was analysed, which 
led to a decision to limit the strength of such kicker. 
• What protection systems are required to prevent 
damage of the machine after a failure? 
• What is the dependability of the protection system? 
(Dependability = reliability and availability). 
More specificically for LHC machine protection: 
• Use of existing ideas and tools + novel approaches; 
• Large redundancy, in particular for detecting failures;  
• Machine protection systems are being developed 
using tools from reliability engineering. The 
dependability has been quantified for the main 
protection systems;  
• Protection systems for powering operation and beam 
operation are separated, with a link from powering 
interlocks to beam interlocks, to dump the beam in 
case of failures in the powering systems; 
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• The time constant for reaction of the protection 
systems in case of failures must be short; 
• Some interlocks can be masked by using a “Safe 
Beam Flag” that is indicates non-destructive beam. 
SINGLE TURN FAILURES 
After a failure, the beam trajectory is determined by the 
magnetic fields. No active protection by sending the beam 
into a dump block is possible. Examples are failures 
during the transfer of beam from SPS to LHC, and 
failures of a kicker magnet. 
To prevent damage during injection, the procedure is: 
• Inject beam of limited intensity. For efficient filling, 
the energy stored in the injected beam is still in the 
order of one MJ; 
• Limit probability for failures to the minimum, by 
monitoring critical parameters (such as magnet 
currents, etc.), and permitting kicker firing only when 
those parameters are within tolerance; 
• Inject high intensity beam only when pilot beam 
already circulates in LHC. The (safe) pilot beam is 
replaced by high intensity beam; 
• Protect exposed equipment by beam absorbers. 
During extraction, all particles should travel into the 
beam dumping blocks.  
To prevent damage during extraction: 
• Limit complexity of the extraction system;   
• Limit risks to LHC by various methods: beam 
dumping system with very high reliability, absorber 
blocks in the extraction area, etc; 
• Limit risks to the extraction channel as far as 
possible, for example by monitoring the orbit in the 
extraction region; 
• In case of a failure, the extraction channel is mostly 
exposed and the risks for the LHC are much smaller; 
• Monitor the orbit around LHC to ensure maximum 
aperture if bunches are not correctly extracted and 
oscillate with large amplitudes; 
Passive protection relies on beam absorbers close to the 
beam. Such absorbers have been studied to absorb beams 
with an energy of ~3 MJ (at injection energy of 450 GeV) 
and ~1 MJ (at 7 TeV).  
MULTITURN FAILURES 
With circulating beams there are many failures leading 
to beam losses after several turns or more: 
• Failures in the magnet and powering system; 
• Wrong operational parameter (tune, chromaticity, 
orbit); 
• Beam instability; 
• Object moves into beam; 
• Transverse damper has wrong phase; 
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• Vacuum problem; 
• RF trip; 
• Others. 
The beam must be extracted before too many particles 
touch the aperture: 
• Detection of the initial failure, or detection of the 
consequences of the failure on the beam; 
• Extracting the beam into the beam dump block. It 
takes only up to three or four turns to detect a failure, 
inform the beam dump kicker, wait for the abort gap, 
and extract the bunch train; 
Detection of failures is with systems of large diverse 
redundancy, both, by hardware diagnostics and beam 
instruments.  
Hardware diagnostics: 
• Vacuum valve leaving the “OUT” position (…away 
from end switch); 
• Other movable devices leaving the “OUT” position 
• Powering failures detected by the power converter, 
requesting a beam dump (typical time in the order of 
10 ms); 
• Quench signal from Quench Protection System;  
• Fast Magnet Current change Monitors (development 
with DESY); 
• Failures of cooling for normal conducting magnets; 
• Failure in the RF system; 
• Failure in critical beam absorbers and collimators;  
Beam instruments: 
• Beam loss monitors at collimators and other aperture 
limitations;   
• Beam loss monitors in the arcs; 
• Fast Beam Position change Monitors – under study 
• Fast Beam Current change (“lifetime”) Monitors – 
under study 
LHC UPGRADING SCENARIOS  
A failure of D1 dipoles is most critical as it leads to a 
fast change of the closed orbit around the accelerator [2]. 
Protons in the tails of the distribution would first touch 
collimator jaws, exceeding more than 109 protons after 
about 15 turns. The losses would be detected by beam 
loss monitors. Assuming that the collimators can 
withstand a beam loss of about 1012 protons, the jaws 
could be damaged already after 30 turns. The beam needs 
to be dumped in less than about 10 turns (1 ms).  
Upgrading scenario with increased beta function: For 
an upgrading scenario with an increase of the beta 
function by a factor of 4, the time for fast beam losses 
after a D1 magnet failure is reduced by a factor of two 
(assuming the same time constants as for D1 type 
magnets in nominal LHC). Together with an increase of 
the number of protons by a factor of 2-3, the time to 
damage equipment after such failure is further reduced. 
Depending on the parameters, it might not be possible 
to safely detect such failure and dump the beam before 
damage occurs. This needs to be considered during the 
design phase, to avoid installing elements in LHC that 
deflect the beam by, say, more than 3-6 σ in a few turns.   
LHC upgrade that includes stronger focusing: When 
comparing different scenarios for upgrading, achieving 
the same luminosity with reduced beam current is 
preferred. Larger aperture in the triplet is very beneficial. 
As discussed above, if the time constant for beam loss 
decreases, protection might become difficult. 
LHC upgrade that includes more beam current: Single 
turn failures become more critical. Injection into LHC: if 
the injected intensity increases substantially, injection 
protection needs to be re-considered. Are the absorbers 
and collimators still robust enough to protect equipment? 
For extraction into the beam dump block with beam 
intensity above ultimate, see [3]. 
For any upgrading scenario beam instrumentation 
becomes increasingly important, to detect failures and 
trigger a beam dump. The dependability for beam 
instruments must be considered. 
• The Beam Loss Monitor System is the most critical 
system together with the Beam Dumping System and 
Beam Interlock System. These systems have been 
developed with their dependability in mind. 
• Fast Beam Current change Monitors used at HERA 
and under discussion for LHC are clearly required. 
Such monitors are somewhat redundant to the BLM 
system. If BLMs miss to detect beam losses, beam 
current decay would still be captured. 
To provide information for safe operation: 
• Fast Beam Current Monitors are required to monitor 
pilot beam. Only when pilot beam is circulating, 
injection of high intensity beam is allowed. 
• DC Beam Current Monitors measure the beam 
current. Together with the energy the beam current is 
used to provide the Safe Beam Flag (If TRUE, 
interlocks can be relaxed, turned out to be very useful 
during CNGS run). 
• Beam Position Monitors should ensure that enough 
aperture is available to avoid single turn failures 
during beam dump. The reliability of BPMs should 
become similar to other systems for protection. 
POSSIBLE RISKS FOR LHC 
Several risks that might prevent the LHC to operate 
with high beam currents and luminosity are considered. In 
general, the risk increases for all upgrading scenarios. 
However, already operation at or even below nominal 
luminosity could be affected.  
Very low margin of the superconducting magnets in 
presence of the enormous energy stored in the beams: The 
collimation system is very challenging and must capture 
most of the protons that are lost. In addition, spikes in the 
beam loss rate have been observed at HERA, exceeding 
the average beam losses by orders of magnitude. For LHC 
at 7 TeV, collimators are very close to the beam and small 
beam movements could produce such spikes. Such spikes 
could quench magnets. In order become less sensitive, 
different ideas should be pursued: 
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• Electron lens to clean the beam halo; 
• Nonlinear collimation; 
• Collimation using crystals. 
• Could we install additional absorbers in the cold 
part? If few short (less than 15 m), stronger dipole 
magnets would replace arc dipoles at some locations, 
space could be made available for absorbers. Such 
absorbers could be held at intermediate temperature. 
In particular, downstream of insertions 3 and 7 such 
devices would capture debris coming from primary 
and secondary absorbers. 
The equipment in the tunnel (e.g. electronics) is 
radiation-tolerant and no major problems with radiation 
are expected. However, most equipment in other 
underground areas is not radiation-tolerant (e.g. powering 
equipment, a large amount [!!] of electronics).  
• The number of single event upsets increases with 
beam current and/or luminosity; 
• Experiments worry about radiation level in their 
control rooms for upgrade; 
• Equipment in the RRs, UAs, UJs, etc. is in general 
commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS); 
• Single event upsets might impact on availability. 
During initial operation, the radiation dose will be 
monitored. What to do in case of problems? 
• Move sensitive equipment to better protected areas 
(e.g. surface); develop radiation tolerant equipment; 
• If high current powering equipment needs to be 
installed in protected areas, superconducting links 
will be required to power superconducting magnets. 
SAFETY CULTURE FOR LHC 
With increasing performance protection becomes 
increasingly important. A “safety culture” for LHC is 
required. Protection is not limited to a few specialists.  
Safety culture includes several measures, such as the 
recording of all failures – in particular of “near misses” 
(events that could have had catastrophic consequences): 
• Failure in the hardware systems; 
• Failure in procedures, software and operation; 
• Unexpected beam dynamics. 
Expectations need to be compared with predictions 
from (reliability) models. This time-consuming, detailed 
work will require resources. It is a new field for 
accelerator physics and technology, and currently there is 
only limited expertise available at CERN in the domain. 
MACHINE PROTECTION FOR 
INJECTORS    
The “LHC machine protection toolkit” should suffice to 
provide protection for all injectors and all upgrades.  
An important issue for high power accelerators is the 
limitation of component activation; beam losses should be 
below about < 1 W/m. The performance of some high 
intensity proton machines is already limited by dose to 
equipment - not by the beam current that could be 
accelerated. Collimators might be required for injectors, 
in particular if the injectors are based on superconducting 
magnets. Other techniques to limit activation have been 
proposed, e.g. a new scheme for PS extraction. 
More performance of injectors might not necessarily 
result in more integrated luminosity for LHC. As an 
example, LEP performance was essentially not 
determined by the performance of the injector chain. 
However, injector availability is important. To increase 
availability it is proposed to extend some of these design 
principles for the machine protection to other systems. 
Some comments for the SPS:  
• An LHC-type Beam Interlock System has been 
partially installed, and will be completed in 2007.  
• The Beam Loss Monitors do not detect all beam 
losses. More monitors and a faster reaction time are 
required, such as for the LHC type BLM system. 
• Injection into the SPS might become an issue for 
some scenarios, for the moment this is not the case. 
LHC type systems should be able to cope with it 
(absorbers, interlocks, etc.). 
• It is proposed to move the internal beam dump block 
out into a short tunnel, not too close to the machine 
(new extraction kicker?). 
CONCLUSIONS 
The different upgrade scenarios should consider 
machine protection from the outset. No element should be 
introduced that could lead to much faster beam losses 
than at the nominal LHC. Experience with early operation 
will be decisive: what is critical and where are the limits? 
There are many potential issues: 
• Beam dynamics (aperture, E-cloud, Beam-Beam); 
• Beam cleaning and quenching; 
• Radiation effects; 
• Activation of materials; 
• Machine Protection and interlocks; 
• Reliability of LHC systems; 
• Injectors; 
• Others… 
A lot of work is being done in view of an LHC 
upgrade. Priority should be given to those projects that 
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